The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arabian Gulf
The Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf wait for statements from their comrades in Cairo, Geneva and London to build their intellectual and media dialogues, says Abdulaziz Alkhamis.
Conflict of survival, volatile changes, and Iranian expansion
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) groups are arranging their positions in the Arabian Gulf in preparation for a new stage. This stage comes after a series of changes that have occurred in the region, with the Gulf governments standing against their activities and restraining them in different places. This occurred especially after the MB sections penetrated into various areas within the Gulf community, perhaps the most important of which are education, banking, and even the media.
Observers believe that the MB in the Gulf have hit - during their expansion - a hard Salafist rock that stood against them and wore their movement down in fierce intellectual, media, and political conflicts. This is perhaps more evident in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Meanwhile, the Gulf regimes have benefited from these conflicts as they are gaining from the continuing Islamist-liberal disputes which diverts attention away from the higher demands for reform. This latter dispute gets activists busy in side conflicts over issues such as the acts of worship and their details, and being loyal to or keeping a distance from the regimes.
What can be sensed clearly in the discourse of the MB in the Gulf, that there is those who believe the harshness of the [security] apparatuses of the Gulf regimes towards them has led to significant failures. Others see that the most important reason is the failure of those to determine their position on the regimes and their lack of courage to run their activities clearly. Most of these groups do not publicly declare their affiliation to the MB, be it is the international or the Egyptian one. Dissimulation is almost their best option when there is a dialogue or a meeting - though few - as its a rare exception to find someone declaring publicly that he is an MB member in the Gulf.
The MB in Kuwait stands on more solid ground than their comrades in other Gulf states, as they are an organized force. This association is recognized by the state, even though it does not carry the name of the MB, and assumes the name of Al-Islah Association, with its political arm being the Kuwaiti Constitutional Movement.
Since Abdul Aziz Al-Mutawa returned from Egypt carrying the thoughts of Hassan al-Banna and the admiration of a student for his teacher, the MB in Kuwait has always been following what comes out of the headquarters of the MB Movement in Egypt. It does not have any significant differences, except in the issues of its local conflicts with various forces on the Kuwaiti political scene.
In Saudi Arabia, the situation is quite different. The MB stands on a quite soft ground, especially after the strong disagreement between the Saudi regime and the MB. This was very evident in the statement by Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, who accused the MB of being behind terrorism and its expansion. This statement made the battle between the two sides an open one. The arms of the MB in Britain, Palestine and the Arab Maghreb launched a counter-attack, accusing Saudi Arabia of presenting an unwelcomed Islamic model, saying it is the one that sponsors terrorism.
The position of the MB in Saudi Arabia is difficult. They have been working in the kingdom since 1954, with their focus and activities directed externally, as they were Egyptians, Syrians, Libyans and Iraqis who fled from the terror of left-wing regimes. They found the Saudi government’s sponsorship attached with the point that their activities should not have an internal dimension. It has become clear after many years that thought can not flow, like a river, in one way and direction, or be affected by side elements. It has become clear that the magician would be affected by his magic. Many Saudis were affected, and some of them operated inside, such as Mohamed Sorour Zine El Abidine, Abdullah Azzam, Man'i Kattan and others. The product of the first was Safar Al-Hawali, Salman Al-Awdah and Ayed Al-Qarni. The second gave us a tough version, which is currently missing in the caves, Osama bin Laden. But the third affected the traditional institution, and its young judges. Unfortunately, his impact was a political not a legislative one. He did not ease off their ultra-verdicts, but made of them tools that produce hard-liners. We must here point out that the attacks by traditional Salafists against the new MB Salafist mix made Al-Hawali go on the defensive, saying that the first one to introduce the thought of the MB into the Salafist institution was Sheikh Abdul Rahman Al-Dosari.
The MB that exists in Saudi Arabia, have members that relish parts of it, not all that it entails, but do not dare to declare that they are a part of the MB or are affiliates of the movement. This is because they are aware that that the group is rejected by their society and its official institutions, and also because of the size of the big failures that were and are being committed by the MB Movement in several places.
In Qatar, the MB decided to dissolve in 1999 and integrated into the machine of the regime, becoming active in the implementation of the Qatari objectives. They are no longer a different organizational group or at a distance from the regime. The differences between the government and the MB in Cairo are perhaps visible, while the Qatari MB lacks the independence from their regime, used by the government in its media machine with the nationalists.
In other Gulf states, the MB movements are affected by the Arab political situation. Perhaps one of the biggest accusations directed at them is the inability of the MB in the Gulf to think locally and follow international affairs, and falling into the hands of external organizations that put on an MB face penetrating through the Gulf street, stretching at the expense of national interests. Many of the Gulf liberals poke fun at the MB in the Gulf as they have to wait for statements from their comrades in Cairo, Geneva or London to commence local intellectual and media dialogues. And of course, most liberals do not differ over what they accused the MB of, especially in waiting for the Western Godot.
It is the failure of the Arab regimes as the youth search for an alternative to fulfill key demands - the first of which is internal reforms, an end to Israeli occupation and a stop of the Persian penetration in many Arab states - encouraging the MB to move in the Gulf. These groups have played on the point of these demands in the Gulf, just like their counterparts in the Arab Maghreb, but they are currently facing significant obstacles. The most vital of these obstacles is perhaps that what it actually offered was not better than what was and is being offered by their enemy, the Arab regimes. Let's look at some points:
The question of internal reforms
The MB groups in the Gulf are still nothing but people with a media lustre who theorize on corruption and democracy, and they do not offer that which they theorize in their traditional institutions and in their authorities, whether in Egypt or in the West. The regimes have traditional, official, tribal and Arab structures that have different trends and orientations, including liberal, Islamic and others. But the MB movement is no more than an Islamist trend with no programs, but only the Quran and Sunnah, which are the same thing that, for example, the Saudi regime relies on. So, what will the MB offer to the Saudis that is different from what Al-Saud provides already?
Freedom and democracy
Can this be provided by someone who was one day on the run from his repressive regime to resort to another regime, which is different only in making the acts of worship mandatory, as the MB did in the sixties during their migration, or their diaspora, to Saudi Arabia? Did the MB participate in the beginning of Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions or joined late after they knew that the government machine of repression weakened, while the MB figures captured the opportunity to appear in the media and the young liberals, the creators of the revolution, were kept off the platform for the celebration of the elimination of tyrants? Will those allied with one of the most oppressive regimes, such as Iran, carry roses of reform to their citizens?
Dealing with the West
The MB proved unprecedented opportunists when they opened secret and public channels for discussions with the Western security agencies after September 11, to present themselves as an alternative to the regimes. These steps made the Gulf youth denounce them and view it as unprecedented opportunism, especially as the media published news of meetings in London and Washington.
Which MB is betterMuslim Brotherhood, like others, have become an internally fragmented and divided movement, and it has got numerous objectives, orientations and voices. Thus, the Gulf youth wonder on the fact that the MB are no longer Brothers, as they have become divided. For an example illustrating this fact, the Qatari Brothers hijacked Islam Online website from its headquarters in Egypt, explaining that they are the “payers”.Sheikh al-Qaradawi - from his Qatari residence - is most influential than all the Egyptian MB sheikhs and even Al Azhar with its majesty. His strength, of course, lies in his noise via Aljazeera. A question persists, what is the message of Al-Qaradawi? and is he considered by the Gulf people as a Sunni Sistani? We all know the sensitivity of the Gulf people towards the outside and its symbols which affect their traditional and local cultures.
Relationship with Iran
A lot of Gulf youth find the MB's relationship with Iran a huge error, especially in the light of the clear Iranian hostility towards the Gulf states and their Arab presence. Those wonder how religious Sunni people put their hands in the hands of Persian Safaween. The youth may understand the MB's cooperation with the Arab Shiites by virtue of the unity of faith. But the lack of MB’s good knowledge on the details of the Gulf, and that the Gulf people are fully knowledgeable of Iran and its ambitions, displays the MB leaders as ones who keep miscalculating and creating an error after another.
One wonders if the MB still as it was under Nasser, a tool directed by the Gulf people at others, and when they affect them internally, they get restrained. This is while the Gulf was being helped in this by their Salafists and economic liberalization, and also their rush for progress and modernization, which all assists in restricting and forcing the MB to play the role assigned to their movement - be an external tool only not a a local player.The truth is that this is what is happening now, despite the fact that a group here and there is trying to enable the MB to exist locally and influentially, especially as represented in the Kuwaiti “Hadas” experience. However, it is the luck of the MB that they stand on a Salafist soil, that does not allow most of the roots of the MB to be stable on them.
Finally, is there a glint at the end of the Gulf tunnel for the MB that enables them to reach what they want? The answer is that the matter needs credibility that is shaky at the moment and will not be accepted. This is because the MB can succeed and have a strong presence in an environment that has not tried the Islamic slogans, and in a society that their regimes moved to Westernize or Easternize forcibly, and not societies where mosques are more than the commercial complexes.
Abdulaziz Alkhamis is a London based Saudi analyst
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=46003
[yt]oogMpsKdU8E&feature=related[/yt]
The Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf wait for statements from their comrades in Cairo, Geneva and London to build their intellectual and media dialogues, says Abdulaziz Alkhamis.
Conflict of survival, volatile changes, and Iranian expansion
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) groups are arranging their positions in the Arabian Gulf in preparation for a new stage. This stage comes after a series of changes that have occurred in the region, with the Gulf governments standing against their activities and restraining them in different places. This occurred especially after the MB sections penetrated into various areas within the Gulf community, perhaps the most important of which are education, banking, and even the media.
Observers believe that the MB in the Gulf have hit - during their expansion - a hard Salafist rock that stood against them and wore their movement down in fierce intellectual, media, and political conflicts. This is perhaps more evident in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Meanwhile, the Gulf regimes have benefited from these conflicts as they are gaining from the continuing Islamist-liberal disputes which diverts attention away from the higher demands for reform. This latter dispute gets activists busy in side conflicts over issues such as the acts of worship and their details, and being loyal to or keeping a distance from the regimes.
What can be sensed clearly in the discourse of the MB in the Gulf, that there is those who believe the harshness of the [security] apparatuses of the Gulf regimes towards them has led to significant failures. Others see that the most important reason is the failure of those to determine their position on the regimes and their lack of courage to run their activities clearly. Most of these groups do not publicly declare their affiliation to the MB, be it is the international or the Egyptian one. Dissimulation is almost their best option when there is a dialogue or a meeting - though few - as its a rare exception to find someone declaring publicly that he is an MB member in the Gulf.
The MB in Kuwait stands on more solid ground than their comrades in other Gulf states, as they are an organized force. This association is recognized by the state, even though it does not carry the name of the MB, and assumes the name of Al-Islah Association, with its political arm being the Kuwaiti Constitutional Movement.
Since Abdul Aziz Al-Mutawa returned from Egypt carrying the thoughts of Hassan al-Banna and the admiration of a student for his teacher, the MB in Kuwait has always been following what comes out of the headquarters of the MB Movement in Egypt. It does not have any significant differences, except in the issues of its local conflicts with various forces on the Kuwaiti political scene.
In Saudi Arabia, the situation is quite different. The MB stands on a quite soft ground, especially after the strong disagreement between the Saudi regime and the MB. This was very evident in the statement by Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, who accused the MB of being behind terrorism and its expansion. This statement made the battle between the two sides an open one. The arms of the MB in Britain, Palestine and the Arab Maghreb launched a counter-attack, accusing Saudi Arabia of presenting an unwelcomed Islamic model, saying it is the one that sponsors terrorism.
The position of the MB in Saudi Arabia is difficult. They have been working in the kingdom since 1954, with their focus and activities directed externally, as they were Egyptians, Syrians, Libyans and Iraqis who fled from the terror of left-wing regimes. They found the Saudi government’s sponsorship attached with the point that their activities should not have an internal dimension. It has become clear after many years that thought can not flow, like a river, in one way and direction, or be affected by side elements. It has become clear that the magician would be affected by his magic. Many Saudis were affected, and some of them operated inside, such as Mohamed Sorour Zine El Abidine, Abdullah Azzam, Man'i Kattan and others. The product of the first was Safar Al-Hawali, Salman Al-Awdah and Ayed Al-Qarni. The second gave us a tough version, which is currently missing in the caves, Osama bin Laden. But the third affected the traditional institution, and its young judges. Unfortunately, his impact was a political not a legislative one. He did not ease off their ultra-verdicts, but made of them tools that produce hard-liners. We must here point out that the attacks by traditional Salafists against the new MB Salafist mix made Al-Hawali go on the defensive, saying that the first one to introduce the thought of the MB into the Salafist institution was Sheikh Abdul Rahman Al-Dosari.
The MB that exists in Saudi Arabia, have members that relish parts of it, not all that it entails, but do not dare to declare that they are a part of the MB or are affiliates of the movement. This is because they are aware that that the group is rejected by their society and its official institutions, and also because of the size of the big failures that were and are being committed by the MB Movement in several places.
In Qatar, the MB decided to dissolve in 1999 and integrated into the machine of the regime, becoming active in the implementation of the Qatari objectives. They are no longer a different organizational group or at a distance from the regime. The differences between the government and the MB in Cairo are perhaps visible, while the Qatari MB lacks the independence from their regime, used by the government in its media machine with the nationalists.
In other Gulf states, the MB movements are affected by the Arab political situation. Perhaps one of the biggest accusations directed at them is the inability of the MB in the Gulf to think locally and follow international affairs, and falling into the hands of external organizations that put on an MB face penetrating through the Gulf street, stretching at the expense of national interests. Many of the Gulf liberals poke fun at the MB in the Gulf as they have to wait for statements from their comrades in Cairo, Geneva or London to commence local intellectual and media dialogues. And of course, most liberals do not differ over what they accused the MB of, especially in waiting for the Western Godot.
It is the failure of the Arab regimes as the youth search for an alternative to fulfill key demands - the first of which is internal reforms, an end to Israeli occupation and a stop of the Persian penetration in many Arab states - encouraging the MB to move in the Gulf. These groups have played on the point of these demands in the Gulf, just like their counterparts in the Arab Maghreb, but they are currently facing significant obstacles. The most vital of these obstacles is perhaps that what it actually offered was not better than what was and is being offered by their enemy, the Arab regimes. Let's look at some points:
The question of internal reforms
The MB groups in the Gulf are still nothing but people with a media lustre who theorize on corruption and democracy, and they do not offer that which they theorize in their traditional institutions and in their authorities, whether in Egypt or in the West. The regimes have traditional, official, tribal and Arab structures that have different trends and orientations, including liberal, Islamic and others. But the MB movement is no more than an Islamist trend with no programs, but only the Quran and Sunnah, which are the same thing that, for example, the Saudi regime relies on. So, what will the MB offer to the Saudis that is different from what Al-Saud provides already?
Freedom and democracy
Can this be provided by someone who was one day on the run from his repressive regime to resort to another regime, which is different only in making the acts of worship mandatory, as the MB did in the sixties during their migration, or their diaspora, to Saudi Arabia? Did the MB participate in the beginning of Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions or joined late after they knew that the government machine of repression weakened, while the MB figures captured the opportunity to appear in the media and the young liberals, the creators of the revolution, were kept off the platform for the celebration of the elimination of tyrants? Will those allied with one of the most oppressive regimes, such as Iran, carry roses of reform to their citizens?
Dealing with the West
The MB proved unprecedented opportunists when they opened secret and public channels for discussions with the Western security agencies after September 11, to present themselves as an alternative to the regimes. These steps made the Gulf youth denounce them and view it as unprecedented opportunism, especially as the media published news of meetings in London and Washington.
Which MB is betterMuslim Brotherhood, like others, have become an internally fragmented and divided movement, and it has got numerous objectives, orientations and voices. Thus, the Gulf youth wonder on the fact that the MB are no longer Brothers, as they have become divided. For an example illustrating this fact, the Qatari Brothers hijacked Islam Online website from its headquarters in Egypt, explaining that they are the “payers”.Sheikh al-Qaradawi - from his Qatari residence - is most influential than all the Egyptian MB sheikhs and even Al Azhar with its majesty. His strength, of course, lies in his noise via Aljazeera. A question persists, what is the message of Al-Qaradawi? and is he considered by the Gulf people as a Sunni Sistani? We all know the sensitivity of the Gulf people towards the outside and its symbols which affect their traditional and local cultures.
Relationship with Iran
A lot of Gulf youth find the MB's relationship with Iran a huge error, especially in the light of the clear Iranian hostility towards the Gulf states and their Arab presence. Those wonder how religious Sunni people put their hands in the hands of Persian Safaween. The youth may understand the MB's cooperation with the Arab Shiites by virtue of the unity of faith. But the lack of MB’s good knowledge on the details of the Gulf, and that the Gulf people are fully knowledgeable of Iran and its ambitions, displays the MB leaders as ones who keep miscalculating and creating an error after another.
One wonders if the MB still as it was under Nasser, a tool directed by the Gulf people at others, and when they affect them internally, they get restrained. This is while the Gulf was being helped in this by their Salafists and economic liberalization, and also their rush for progress and modernization, which all assists in restricting and forcing the MB to play the role assigned to their movement - be an external tool only not a a local player.The truth is that this is what is happening now, despite the fact that a group here and there is trying to enable the MB to exist locally and influentially, especially as represented in the Kuwaiti “Hadas” experience. However, it is the luck of the MB that they stand on a Salafist soil, that does not allow most of the roots of the MB to be stable on them.
Finally, is there a glint at the end of the Gulf tunnel for the MB that enables them to reach what they want? The answer is that the matter needs credibility that is shaky at the moment and will not be accepted. This is because the MB can succeed and have a strong presence in an environment that has not tried the Islamic slogans, and in a society that their regimes moved to Westernize or Easternize forcibly, and not societies where mosques are more than the commercial complexes.
Abdulaziz Alkhamis is a London based Saudi analyst
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=46003
[yt]oogMpsKdU8E&feature=related[/yt]